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Building upon the classical concept of H older continuity and the notion
of \continuous implementation"introduced in Oury and Tercieux (2009), we
dene H older continuous implementation. We show that, under a richness
assumption on the payo proles (associated with outcomes), the following
full characterization result holds for nite mechanisms: a social choice function
is H older continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable
in rationalizable messages.
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11 Introduction
There are many ways of implementing a social choice function. Partial Nash imple-
mentation, which is widely used both in theoretical and applied works, is often seen
as a quite weak requirement1. At the other extreme stands full implementation in
rationalizable messages which is known to have a lot of bite. To put it informally, we
assume, in the present paper, that the social planner has some \small doubts"about
his model and we show that full implementation in rationalizable messages is nec-
essary (and sucient) for partial Nash implementation in this context.
More precisely, we follow the approach introduced in Oury and Tercieux (2009)
(hereafter OT) and require that in any model that embeds the initial model, there
exists an equilibrium that yields \the desired outcome", not only at all types of the
initial model but also at all types \close"to initial types. To formalize closeness, we
use the method introduced by Harsanyi (1967) and developed in Mertens and Zamir
(1985). Each type in the initial model is mapped into a hierarchy of beliefs. Then,
following the interim approach due to Weinstein and Yildiz (2007)(hereafter WY),
we dene a notion of \nearby"type. This notion, formally described by the product
topology in the universal type space, captures the restrictions on the modeler's
ability to observe the players' (high order) beliefs.
If our approach is similar to that of OT, two important dierences between
their setup and ours must be pointed out. First, as in WY, we assume that for
each state of nature, the payo proles (associated with each outcome) may slightly
dier from those corresponding to the benchmark model the social planner has
in mind. (This richness assumption will be explained in more details in the next
paragraph.) Second, for a xed model (that embeds the initial one), our denition of
a \satisfactory"equilibrium is dierent from that dened in OT. On the one hand,
we do not require partial implementation in strict (or pure) Nash equilibrium on
the initial model. On the other hand, our continuity condition is (slightly) stronger
than that of OT since, in the present paper, \H older continuity"is required. We do
believe that this latter restriction is very weak: this technical point is more precisely
presented and discussed in Subsection 2.3.
This paper establishes the following full characterization result for nite mech-
anisms: a social choice function f is (partially) H older continuously implementable
1For instance, in complete information settings and with more than three players, any social
choice function can be partially implemented.
2if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable messages. If this result
is reminiscent of that of WY, our technical contribution is very dierent from the
contagion argument which is used in their proof. This is due to the specicity of
mechanism design. Let us be more precise. In the model of WY, a set of actions is
xed (and common knowledge). Hence, a parameter (that is, a \state of nature")
may be identied with a function that maps action proles to payo proles. By
contrast, in the present implementation setting, only the set of outcomes is initially
xed and a parameter may be identied with a function that maps outcomes to
payo proles2. The richness assumption of WY, which species that each action of
each player can be strictly dominant for some parameter value, makes it immediate
to break the ties for best reply in favor of a desired action. Indeed, it suces to
allow the type to put slightly higher probability on the payo function at which
this action is strictly dominant. To put it another way, to \obtain strictness"-which
is necessary for contagion-, one can perturb the rst-order belief of a type slightly.
Such a possibility does not exist in our context.
2 Setup
We consider a nite set I = f1;:::;Ig of players. Each agent i has a utility function
ui : A  ?? ! R where ?? is the set of states of nature and A is the nite set
of outcomes. A model T is a pair (T;) where T = T1  :::  TI is a type space
and (ti) 2 (??  T i) denotes the associated beliefs for each ti 2 Ti. The social
planner has an initial nite model in mind which we denote by  T and desires to
implement the social choice function f :  T ! A.
2.1 Richness assumption
We assume that for each  ti 2  Ti, the support of the distribution marg??( ti) is





 ti2  Ti
supp(marg??( ti)):
Let us also assume that for each  2 , it is possible to slightly "perturb" the payos
associated with . More precisely:
2In this paper, we maintain the assumption that sending a message is costless. See OT for
implications of continuity when this assumption is relaxed.
3Assumption 1 For each outcome a 2 A, each player i 2 I and each state of nature








for all a0 6= a.
To illustrate this assumption, consider the case where ?? is simply an index for
the prole of payo functions. For instance, take ?? = ??
1  :::  ??
I with
??
i  [0;1]jAj, for each i and ui(??;a) = ??
i (a), for each (i;a;??). Assumption 1
may then be restated as follows: for each  2 , there exists an open set V () in
[0;1]jAjI such that V ()  ?? and  2 V ().
In the rest of the paper, we will only consider states of natures belonging to the
nite set ? dened by:










that is, we restrict ourselves to  and all the relevant perturbations around it. In
addition, we write for each  2 ,  = (; ~ 0) and ??(;a;i) = (; ~ a
i ), for each









A mechanism species a message set for each agent and a mapping from message
proles to outcomes. More precisely, we write M as an abbreviation for
Q
i2I Mi
(where Mi is the message set of player i) and for each i, M i for
Q
j6=i Mj. (Similar
abbreviations will be used throughout the paper for analogous objects.) A mecha-
nism M is a pair (M;g) where M is nite and the outcome function g : M ! A
assigns to each message prole m an alternative g(m) 2 A. By a slight abuse of
notations, given a space X, we will sometimes note x for the degenerate distribution
in (X) assigning probability 1 to fxg; g will also be extended to lotteries, i.e.,
given  2 i2I(Mi), g() denotes the lottery
P
m2M (m)g(m).
For each mechanism M and model T ; we write U(M;T ) for the induced incom-
plete information game. In this game, a (behavioral) strategy of a player i is any
4measurable function i : Ti ! (Mi): Given any type ti and any strategy prole
, we write i( j ti;) 2 (?  M i) for the joint distribution on the underlying








for each player i, type ti and strategy prole .
Denition 1 A prole of strategies  = (1;:::;I) is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in
U(M;T ) i for each i 2 I and ti 2 Ti, the support of i(ti) is included in BR(jti).
Denition 2 The social choice function f is partially implementable i there exists
a nite mechanism M = (M;g) and an equilibrium  in U(M;  T) such that for
each  t 2  T: g(( t)) = f( t).
2.3 H older continuous implementation
For each metric space X, x 2 X and  > 0, we write respectively B(x) and  B(x)
for the open and the closed balls of radius  about x. For each integer n, Rn will
always be endowed with the max norm, i.e.:
jjxjj = max (x
1;:::;x
n);
for each x 2 Rn. In addition, we dene for each n: n 1 := fx 2 Rn
+
 Pn
`=1 x` = 1g:
A (mixed) outcome a 2 (A) is viewed as a point in jAj 1. (Hence, in our setting,
the maximal distance between two outcomes a;a0 2 (A) is equal to one.)
We also dene a topology on types. We rst recall the notion of hierarchy of
beliefs. Given a model (T;) and a type ti in type space Ti, we can compute the




which is called the "rst-order belief" of ti. We can compute the second-order belief















5for each measurable set F  ?  (?)I: Proceeding iteratively in this way, we




set of all belief hierarchies for which it is common knowledge that the beliefs are
coherent (i.e., each player knows his beliefs and his beliefs at dierent orders are
consistent with each other) is the universal type space (see Mertens and Zamir
(1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)). We denote by T ?
i the set of player i0s




i . Each T ?
i is endowed with
the product topology: a sequence of types ftn
i g1
n=0 converges to a type ti; if, for each
k, hk
i(tn
i ) converges toward hk
i(ti) in the topology of weak convergence of measures.





i(ti[n]);hk(ti)) where the metric dk(:;:) on the kth level beliefs (i.e. on
(Xk 1)) is one that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of measures3. For




We are now in position to state a formal denition of H older continuous implemen-
tation.
Denition 3 Fix a countable model T and a mechanism M. We say that an equi-
librium  in U(M;T ) is H older continuous if there exists  > 0 such that for each
 2 (0;1),  t 2  T and t 2  B( t),




Denition 4 The social choice function f is H older continuously implementable if
there exists a nite mechanism M such that for each countable model T , there exists
an H older continuous equilibrium  in U(M;T ).
Notice that for each model T   T , if an equilibrium  in U(M;T ) is H older
continuous, then we must have:
g(( t)) = f( t);
for each  t 2  T. In other words, H older continuous implementation implies partial
implementation.
Of course, assuming H older continuous implementation is stronger than merely
assuming that for each model T , there exists an equilibrium  in U(M;T ) such that
3For example, the Prokhorov metric.
6for each type prole  t 2  T and each sequence of type proles ftngn2N with tn !  t,
we have: limn!1 g((tn)) ! f( t). However, since the parameter  can be chosen
arbitrarily small, we believe that the technical restriction induced by our denition
is quite weak. In addition, if for some specic reason (due to the context), H older
continuity seems too strong, this condition can be replaced by any other (ordered)
family of moduli of continuity. For instance, our characterization results holds (and
the proof is exactly the same) if we replace Equation (1) by:








which corresponds to a weaker requirement than H older continuity.
3 Characterization Result
Let us rst recall the denition of interim correlated rationalizability given in Dekel,
Fudenberg and Morris (2006, 2007). Pick any prole of types t drawn from some
arbitrary model T = (T;). For each i and ti; set R0
i(ti j M;T ) = Mi; and
dene the sequence fRk
i(ti j M;T )gk2N iteratively as follows. For each integer k,
message mi 2 Mi belongs to Rk
i (ti j M;T ) if and only if there exists some belief
i 2 (?  T i  M i) such that mi is a best response to i and:
1. marg?T ii = (ti)
2. i(?;t i;m i) > 0 =) m i 2 R
k 1
 i (t i j M;T );
where R
k 1




j (tj j M;T ). The set of all rationaliz-
able messages for player i(of type ti) is
R
1





i(ti j M;T ):
Finally, for each type prole t 2 T, we set:
R





i (ti j M;T ).
Denition 5 A social choice function is fully implementable in rationalizable mes-
sages if there is a nite mechanism M such that for each  t 2  T and m 2 R1( t j
M;  T ), we have: g(m) = f( t).
7We now give our characterization result.
Theorem 1 The social choice function f is H older continuously implementable if
and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable messages by a nite mechanism.
Proof. The proof of the \if part"of Theorem 1 is quite short and as follows. Assume
that f :  T ! A is fully implementable in rationalizable messages by a nite mech-
anism M = (M;g). Lemma 1 below is a direct consequence of Dekel, Fudenberg,
Morris (2006).
Lemma 1 For each integer n, there exists some  (n) > 0 satisfying the following
property for each model T . For all  t 2  T and t 2 T with t 2  B (n)( t):
R
n(t j M;T )  R
n( t j M;  T ):
On the other hand, since M and  T are nite, there exists an integer  n such that
for each  t 2  T:
R
1( t j M;  T ) = R
 n( t j M;  T ):
Notice that there exists ? > 0 such that: 1
?( ( n))? = 1. Now, pick some model
T = (T;) and some Bayes Nash equilibrium4  in U(M;T ). We show that  is
?-continuous, that is, for each  t 2  T,  2 (0;1) and t 2  B( t):
jjg((t))   f( t)jj 
?
? : (2)
By construction of ?, for each    ( n), Equation 2 is trivially satised. In addition,
for each  <  ( n), t 2  B( t) and m(t) 2 supp((t)), we have: m(t) 2 R1(t j
M;T ). Consequently, m(t) 2 R n(t j M;T ). Since t 2  B ( n)( t), we obtain applying
Lemma 1 above: m(t) 2 R n( t j M;  T ) = R1( t j M;  T ). Hence, the fact that M
fully implements f in rationalizable messages implies that: g(m(t)) = f( t), which
concludes the proof.
We now move to the \only if"part of Theorem 1. We need Theorem 2 below
whose proof is presented in Section 3 and which concerns continuous implementa-
4The existence of a Bayes Nash equilibrium can be proved using Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg's
xed point theorem. The space of strategy proles is compact in the product topology. Using the
fact that ui : A   ! R is bounded (since A and  are nite), all the desired properties of the
best response correspondence (in particular upper hemicontinuity) can be proved.
8tion for nite type spaces. (Indeed, observe that when type spaces are nite, as-
suming H older continuous implementation is equivalent to merely requiring partial
implementation5.) We rst introduce two additional denitions.
Denition 6 Fix a decreasing function e : N ! R+ with limN!1 e(N) = 0. For
each nite mechanism M and nite type space T , we say that an equilibrium  in
U(M;T ) is e-continuous if for each  t 2  T and each t 2  B 1
N( t), we have: g((t)) 2
 Be(N)(f( t)):
Denition 7 Fix a decreasing function e : N ! R+ with limN!1 e(N) = 0. The
s.c.f f is e-continuously implementable i there exists a nite mechanism M such
that for all nite type spaces T , there is an e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M;T ).
Theorem 2 There exists a function e : N ! R+ with limN!1 e(N) = 0 such that
social choice function f is e-continuously implementable only if it is fully imple-
mentable in rationalizable messages.
Proof. See Section 3.
Now, assume that f is H older continuously implementable on countable type
spaces by some mechanism M. Then, there must exist an integer ? such that
for each nite model T , there exists an ?-H older continuous equilibrium  in
U(M;T ).(Indeed, assume that it is not the case. This means that for each integer
q > 0 there exists a nite model T (q) such that there is no 1
q- H older continuous
equilibrium  in U(M;T (q)). Now set: T =
S
q2N T(q): Notice that for each equilib-
rium  in U(M;T ) and each q, the restriction jT(q) of the equilibrium  to the type
space T(q) is also an equilibrium. Hence, there cannot exist an H older-continuous
equilibrium  in U(M;T ), a contradiction.) Consequently, by Theorem 2 (setting
e(N) = 1
?( 1
N)?), we know that f is fully implementable in rationalizable messages.
5More precisely, for each nite model T , there exists ? 2 (0;1) such that for each  t 2  T:
B( t) \ T = ;:




and the condition of ?-H older continuity is trivially satised for the nite model T .
94 Proof of Theorem 2
Assume that there exists a nite mechanism  M = (  M;g) and a decreasing function
e : N ! [0;1] with limN!1 e(N) = 0 such that for each nite type space T , there
exists an e-continuous equilibrium  in U(  M;T ).
We restrict our attention to mechanisms M = (M;g) where g is the outcome
function of mechanism  M and M = i2IMi with Mi  (  Mi), for each i. The
core of the proof uses a geometric argument. For each i, each message mi 2 (  Mi)




i g. That is, for each k = 1;:::;j  Mij, the message  mk
i is identied
with the point of Rj  Mij whose all components are equal to 0 except for the k-th
one, which is equal to 1. Similarly, we put an arbitrary order on  M i and write
 M i = f m1
 i;:::;  m
j  M ij
 i g. Each m i 2 (  M i) is identied with a point in the
coordinate system of Rj  M ij associated with  M i:
For any subset S, we write jSj for its cardinal. We also write A(S) for the ane





    
9  2 R














    
9  2 R
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In a standard way, we write dim(S) for the dimension of A(S). Finally, we intro-
duce the following denition.
Denition 8 The message space M = I
i=1Mi  i2I(  Mi) has no redundant
messages if for each player i and each mi, m0










4.1 Intuition of the proof
Let us give a brief sketch of the proof. For simplicity, we assume here that there are
only two players and that the initial model  T is a complete information one. The
arguments are quite similar in the general setting.
10Intuitively, the starting point of the proof is as follows. Fix a message space,
M = i2IMi  i2I(  Mi), with no redundant message, a player i, a state of nature
 2  and two messages mi;m0
i 2 Mi. Write6 S(mi;m0
i;) for the set of messages
mj 2 (Mj) such that, at state , the (expected) payo of player i associated
with lottery g(mi;mj) is equal to the one associated with lottery g(m0
i;mj). By the
multilinearity of the (expected) payo function, S(mi;m0
i;) is the intersection of
(Mj) with an ane subspace. Of course, if mi and m0
i are not payo equivalent,
the dimension of S(mi;m0
i;) is strictly smaller than that of Mj. Now, assume that
mi and m0
i are payo equivalent. Since M has no redundant message, there must
exist mj(mi;m0




using our local richness assumption, it is also possible to slightly perturb the payos
of the outcomes at state  in such a way that, when mj(mi;m0
i) is played, the
(expected) payos of player i associated with mi and m0
i are no longer equal. Since
the message spaces are nite, it is possible to perturb the payos in such a way that
there is no pair of payo equivalent messages. Hence, with these perturbed payos,
for each i and mi;m0
i 2 Mi, the dimension of S(mi;m0
i;) is strictly smaller than
that of Mj.
This means that, if for some type space T and some equilibrium , the dimension
of j(Tj) is equal to that of Mj, then, for each  2 , one can build a type ti() and
an associated belief (ti()) 2 (?  Tj) such that :
 (i) marg?(ti())[; ~ 0] is close to one;
 (ii) The best-response of type ti() against j is a singleton.
Similarly, we show that if, in addition, there exist tj 2 Tj and mj 2 Mj with
j(tj) = mj, then, for each  2 , one can build a type ti(;mj) and a belief
(ti(;mj)) 2 (?  Tj) such that (i) and (ii) above are satised and:
 (iii) Type ti(;mj) puts a probability close to one on message mj when j is
played;
With this intuition in mind, we proceed as follows. The proof has four steps. In
the rst step (Proposition 1), we build a \suciently small"message space, M? =
i2IM?
i  i2I(  Mi), and a \suciently large"model T 0 such that for each e-
continuous equilibrium  in U(M?;T 0) and each player i: dim(i(T 0
i )) = dim(M?
i ):
6Since our formal setting is more general, the notations used in the core of the proof are dierent.
11Proposition 2 then establishes in a formal way the intuition we explained above to
generate \strictness".
In the third step of the proof (Proposition 3), we build a model ~ T  T 0 which will
serve as a starting point for the contagion argument of Step 4. More precisely, x an
equilibrium7  in U(M?;T 0). Applying our argument on strictness (Propositions
1 and 2), we build for each player i, a type t1
i such that the best response of t1
i
when  is played in U(M?;T 0) is a singleton, denoted m1
i. Notice that, for each
 2 , the best reply of player j to m1
i at state  is not necessarily unique. However,
applying Propositions 1 and 2 again and the upper semi-continuity of the best-
response correspondence, we show that it is possible to build a type t2
j() which puts
a very high probability on type t1
i and on state  and whose best response against 
is a singleton, denoted m2
j(), which is also a best-reply to m1







j()g. By the same argument as above, for each i 2 (M2
j ()), we can
build a type t3
j(;i) whose unique best response is the message m3
j(;i) which is
also a best-response to the belief i at . Hence, proceeding iteratively until a xed
point is reached (recall that M? is nite), we build a type space ~ T and a message
space ~ M() such that, for each i, the following two properties are satised:
1. Closedness: For each belief i 2 ( ~ Mj()), there is a message mi 2 ~ Mi()
such that mi is a best reply to i at .
2. Full range: For each mi 2 ~ Mi(), there is a type ti 2 ~ Ti whose unique best
response (when  is played in U(M?;T 0)) is mi.
Now, x a rationalizable message mi in the complete information game associated
with  and ~ M(). We show in the last step of the proof (Proposition 4) that it is
possible to build a type ti which plays mi as unique best-reply (when  is played
in U(M?;T 0)) and is arbitrarily close to the complete information type associated
with . To see why, rst notice that by Point 1 above (Closedness), mi is also
rationalizable at  when the message space is M?. The sequel of the proof is then
similar to the contagion argument used in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007). (To change
a best response into a strict best response, we use Point 2 above (Full range).)
7Of course, there may exist innitely many e-continuous equilibria in U(M?;T 0). To avoid
technicalities, we neglect the issue of cardinality of the type spaces. Details are provided in the
proof.
124.2 Step 1
In this rst step of the proof, topological arguments are used to establish Proposition
1 below.
Proposition 1 There exist a nite message space M? = I
i=1M?
i  I
i=1(  Mi) and
a nite model T 0 such that the following three conditions are satised:
1. The mechanism M? = (M?;g) allows for e-continuous implementation,
2. The message space M? has no redundant message,






Proof. For each player i, we use the Hausdor metric on the set of nite message
spaces Mi  (  Mi). More precisely, for each Mi;M0
i  (  Mi), the distance between
Mi and M0
i is dened by:
d(Mi;M
0

















where we recall that jjmi   m0
ijj is the distance associated with the max norm on
j  Mij 1.
We dene for each i and pi = 0;:::;j  Mij   1, the subsets Li(pi) and  Li(pi) as
follows. We set: Li(j  Mij   1) =  Mi and for each pi = 0;:::;j  Mij   2, a message set
Mi belongs to Li(pi) if and only if there exists M0
i 2  Li(pi + 1) (where  Li(pi + 1) is
the closure of Li(pi +1) using the topology induced by the Hausdor distance) and
an ane subspace E of A(M0
i) such that: Co(Mi) = E \ Co(M0
i). In addition, for
each vector ~ p = (p1;:::;pI), we let  L(~ p) = I
i=1 Li(pi) and for each integer p, we let
 L(p) be the union of the sets  L(~ p) with ~ p satisfying
PI
i=1 pi = p. Claim 1 provides
basic properties of the family of subspaces f Li(pi)g
pi=j  Mij 1
pi=0 .
Claim 1 For each i and pi = 0;:::;j  Mij   1:
(i) There exists K(pi) such that each message set Mi 2  Li(pi) satises: jMij 
K(pi) (and may thus be identied with an element of (j  Mij 1)K(pi));
(ii) The set  Li(pi) is compact in (j  Mij 1)K(pi);
13(iii) For each Mi 2  Li(pi), we have: dim(Mi)  pi.
Proof. See Appendix.




K(pi) and in the sequel of this subsection, we
restrict our attention to messages spaces M where for each player i, the cardinality
of Mi is bounded by  K. In addition, each message space M is identied with an
element of I
i=1(j  Mij 1)
 K. Moreover, for each nite model T , each message space
M and each player i a strategy of i is identied with an element of (
 K 1)jT ij. The
proof of Claim 2 below is standard.
Claim 2 Fix a nite model T . The following two properties are satised:




2. For each message space M allowing e-continuous implementation, the set of
e-continuous equilibria in U(M;T ) is compact.
Proof. See Appendix.
Using compactness of  L(p) and Point 1 of Claim 2 above (Point 2 will be used
in the proof of Proposition 3), we establish Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2 Fix an integer p. If, for each p0  p, there is no message space in  L(p0)
allowing for e-continuous implementation, then there exists a nite model T (p) for
which, for each p0  p and each message space M 2  L(p0), there is no e-continuous
equilibrium in U((M;g);T (p)).
Proof. See Appendix.
Now, let p? be the smallest integer p such that there exists a message space
belonging to  L(p) and allowing for e-continuous implementation. (Since  M allows
for e-continuous implementation, such a p? is well-dened.) Let M(p?) 2  L(p?) be
a message space allowing for e-continuous implementation. We establish that the
mechanism M(p?) = (M(p?);g) and the model T (p?   1) (with the notation of
Lemma 2 above) satisfy Point 3 of Proposition 1.
Lemma 3 For each e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M(p?);T (p?   1)):
A( i(T i(p
?   1))) = A(M i(p
?)); (3)
for each player i.
14Proof. See Appendix. The intuition is as follows. We show that if there exists
an e-continuous equilibrium  which does not satisfy Equation (3), then there must
exist a message space M 2  L(p? 1) such that  is also an e-continuous equilibrium
in the game U(M;T (p?   1)), a contradiction with the denition of T (p?   1).
We now conclude the proof of Proposition 1. For each player i, if there are
some redundant messages in Mi(p?), then we eliminate all of them but one. This
procedure yields M?.
We show that the mechanism M? and the model T (p?   1) satisfy the three
conditions of Proposition 1. Regarding Point 1, notice that if for some model T , 
is an equilibrium in U(M(p?);T ), then we can nd an equilibrium 0 in U(M?;T )
such that for each i and ti 2 Ti, g((ti);) = g(0(ti);). Since M(p?) allows for
e-continuous implementation, this means that the mechanism (M?;g) also allows for
e-continuous implementation. Claim 3 below (whose proof is standard and relegated
to the Appendix) establishes that Point 2 is satised.
Claim 3 The message space M? has no redundant message.
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, regarding Point 3, x an e-continuous equilibrium  2 U(M?;T (p? 1)).
The strategy prole  must also be an e-continuous equilibrium in U(M(p?);T (p? 
1)). (Indeed, if m0
i 2 Mi(p?) n M?





i;m i) for each m i 2 M?
 i.) Consequently, by Lemma 3
above, for each player i :
A( i(T i(p




Since  is a strategy prole in U(M?;T (p?   1)), we also have:
A( i(T i(p
?   1)))  A(M
?
 i): (5)
Equations (4) and (5) together establish Point 3, which concludes the proof of Propo-
sition 18.
8In the sequel of the proof, we follow the notations of Proposition 1 and write T 0 for the model
T (p?   1).
154.3 Step 2
We now move to the second step of the proof. For each player i, let us dene the
mapping f1
 i :  !  M i by: f1
 i() =  m1
 i, for each  2 . In addition, for each
k = 2;:::;j  M ij; and  2 , we dene the mapping f
k;
 i :  !  M i by:
f
k;







0) =  m
1
 i;
for each 0 6= . We write   i for the set of mappings from  to (  M i) and identify
each  i 2   i with a point in the coordinate system of Rjj(j  M ij 1)+1 associated








 i g. Finally, we write ?
 i for
the set of mappings from  to [A(M?
 i) \ (  M i)]:
For each ~ " = ("a)a2A 2 RjAj, we dene u~ "
i : A ! R by u~ "
i(a;) = ui(a;)+"a,
for each a 2 A and  2 . For each  ti 2  Ti and ~ " 2 RjAj, we dene the expected










for all mi 2 M?
i and  i 2 ?









for all  i 2 ?
 i. We write Eu ti and BR ti for the expected utility function and the
best response correspondence associated with the vector ~ " 2 RjAj where "a = 0 for
each a 2 A. (We will follow similar notations for similar notions in the sequel of the
proof.)
In the third step of the proof (Proposition 3), we will associate a mapping  i and
a vector ~ " with a type. Since type spaces are discrete in our setting, we introduce the
following notion of discretization. For each player i and integer N, we write  i(N)
for the set of elements x 2 dim(?
 i) such that, for each ` = 0;:::;dim(?
 i), x` is a




 i g  ?
 i, we also note (N;S i)






    













16We write  i for the operator that maps each subset Y  ?
 i to its Lebesgue
measure9 in ?
 i. Finally, for each  r > 0, we write S i( r) for the set of subsets
S i  ?
 i such that:
1. jS ij = dim(?
 i) + 1, and
2.  i(Co(S i))   r.
Proposition 2 states in a formal way the intuition we presented in subsection 3.1
as the starting point of the proof.





"a  1 and N? such
that for each  ti 2  Ti and each S i 2 S i( r), there is  i 2 (N?;S i) satisfying:
1. BR
~ "( r)
 ti ( i) is a singleton, and
2. BR
~ "( r)
 ti ( i)  BR ti( i).
Proof. Fix  ti 2  Ti. For any ~ " 2 RjAj, we dene the equivalence relation ~ "
 ti on M?
i
by mi ~ "
 ti m0
i if and only if
Eu
~ "





for all  i 2 ?
 i. We write [mi]
~ "




i = 2 [mi]
~ "

















Finally, we write ~ "






i = 2 [mi]~ "
 ti. Claim 4 will be used in the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5. In the sequel,
for simplicity, we write "ane hyperplane of ?




Claim 4 For each i 2 I,  ti 2  Ti and ~ " 2 RjAj, the set ~ "





2 ane hyperplanes of ?
 i.
9More precisely, dene an ane basis B i in ?
 i and an ane application L associating to each
 i 2 ?
 i its coordinates in the coordinate system associated with B i. Write L
 i for the operator
associated with the Lebesgue measure in Rdim(
?
 i) normalized by L
 i(L(?
 i)) = 1. Finally, dene
 i by  i = L
 i  L.
17Proof. We establish that for each mi;m0
i with m0









By the multilinearity of the expected utility function Eu~ "




























 i, a contradiction with the assumption
that m0
i = 2 [mi]~ "
 ti.
Now, for each i,  ti 2  Ti and ~ " 2 RjAj, set:
 
~ "












 ti( i) * BR ti( i)g:
Since M? has no redundant message, one can show that for each  " > 0, there





 ti 6= [m0
i]
~ "( ")
 ti . Hence, Claim 4 enables us to establish Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 4 Fix  " > 0. There exists ~ "( ") 2 R
jAj
+ with k~ "( ")k <  " such that for all
players i and all types  ti, the set  ~ "





ane hyperplanes of ?
 i.
Proof. See Appendix.






 i to establish Lemma 5 below.
Lemma 5 For each  > 0, there exists  "() > 0 such that for each ~ " 2 RjAj with
k~ "k   "() and  ti 2  Ti, the set  ~ "





2 ane hyperplanes of ?
 i.
Proof. See Appendix.
For each  r > 0, when  is very small, the measure of the -neighborhood of any
ane hyperplane of ?
 i is very small when compared to that of any set S i 2 S i( r).
This is the intuition of Lemma 6 below.
18Lemma 6 For each  r > 0, there exist N? and ( r) > 0 such that for each S i 2
S i( r) and ane hyperplane H of ?
 i:






i   1j) + 1
:
Proof. See Appendix.
We now conclude the proof of Proposition 2. Fix  r > 0. We choose N = N?
and  = ( r) (as dened in Lemma 6),  " = min( 1
jAj;  "()) (where  "() is as dened
in Lemma 4) and ~ "( r) = ~ "( ") (as dened in Lemma 5).
Let us check that ~ "( r) and N? satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2. First
notice that since jj~ "( r)jj < 1
jAj, we have:
P
a2A "a( r)  1. Now, x some  ti 2  Ti.
By Lemmas 4 and 5, the set  
~ "( r)
1 ( ti) [  
~ "( r)
2 ( ti) is included in the union of the -
neighborood of at most jM?
i j(jM?
i j 1) ane hyperplanes of ?
 i. Consequently, for
each S i 2 S i( r), applying Lemma 6, we have:
j (N?;S i) \ f 
~ "( r)
1 ( ti) [  
~ "( r)





i j   1)
jM?
i j(jM?
i j   1) + 1
< 1:
This means that there exists  i 2 (N?;S i) which does not belong to  
~ "( r)
1 ( ti) [
 
~ "( r)
2 ( ti), i.e., which is such that the two conditions of Proposition 2 are satised.
4.4 Step 3
We now use Propositions 1 and 2 to build a model ~ T which contains the model T 0
(as dened in Proposition 1) and which will be the starting point of the contagion
argument used in Proposition 4.
Proposition 3 There exists a nite type space ~ T such that for each e-continuous
equilibrium  in U(M?; ~ T ), there is a message space ~ M() = I
i=1 ~ Mi()  M?
satisfying the following two properties:
1. (Closedness): If  i 2 ?
 i is such that  i() 2 ( ~ M i()), for each  2 ,
then we have:
~ Mi() \ BR ti( i) 6= ;;
for each  ti 2  Ti.
2. (Full Range): For each mi 2 ~ Mi(), there exists ~ ti(mi;) 2 ~ Ti such that
BRi( i j ~ ti(mi;)) = fmig.
19Proof. We need to introduce some additional notations. For each i, we set:

 i = f! i  (T
0
 i)
 s:t: j! ij = dim(
?
 i) + 1g:
We write 0 for the set of e-continuous equilibria in U(M?;T 0). With a slight
abuse of notations, for each  i 2 0
 i and ! i 2 





 i g for the subset of ?
 i associated with  i and ! i. Notice
that  i  ! i contains (at most) dim(?
 i) + 1 elements. Using Proposition 1 and
the fact that 0 is compact (Claim 2, Point 2), we establish Lemma 7 below.
Lemma 7 There exists  r > 0 satisfying the following property. For each e-continuous
equilibrium  in U(M?;T 0) and each player i, there exists ! i 2 
 i such that
 i  ! i 2 S i( r).
Proof. See Appendix.
Recall that ~ "( r) (as dened in Proposition 2) belongs to R
jAj
+ and is such that
P
a2A

















Lemma 8 Fix  ti 2  Ti and ! i 2 
 i. There exists a type space Ti( ti;! i) such that
for each e-continuous  in U(M?;T 0),  i 2 (N?; i(! i)) and  ti 2  Ti, there is a




i ;m ijti( i);) = ( ti)[]"
a
i( r;) i(m ij);
for all a 2 A?,  2  and m i 2 M?
 i.
Proof. See Appendix.










We write T 1 for the belief-closed model associated with the type space I
i=1T 1
i .
Using Point 1 of Proposition 2, we establish that this model satises the following
property.
20Lemma 9 For each e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M?;T 1) and each player i,
there exists a type ti() 2 T 1
i n T 0
i such that BR( j ti()) is a singleton.
Proof. See Appendix.
Using Points 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 and proceeding in a way similar to that of
Lemma 9, we establish Lemma 10 below.
Lemma 10 There is a family of models fT ngn1 with T n  T n+1 satisfying the
following two properties for each integer n  2 and each e-continuous equilibrium 
in U(M?;T n) :
1. For each i, the set Mn
i () := fmi 2 M?
i j 9 ti 2 T n
i n T 0
i s.t. BR(jti) = fmigg
is non-empty.
2. For all  ti 2  Ti and  i 2 ((M
n 1
 i (jTn 1)) (where jTn 1 is the restriction of
 to T n 1), there is a type ti 2 T n
i such that BR(jti) is a singleton included
in BR ti( i).
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, we show that the model ~ T := T
PI
i=1 jM?
i j+1 satises the two properties
stated in Proposition 3. Fix an e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M?; ~ T ). Notice that
for each integer n 2 f1;:::;
PI
i=1 jM?
i jg, Mn(jTn)  Mn+1(jTn+1). Since the message
space M? is nite, this means that there must exist ~ n 2 f2;:::;
PI
i=1 jM?
i j +1g such
that M ~ n(jT ~ n) = M ~ n 1(jT ~ n 1).
Set ~ M() := M ~ n(jT ~ n). By construction, the Full range condition of Proposition
3 (Point 2) is satised. Let us check that the Closedness condition of Proposition
3 (Point 1) also holds. Fix i 2 I,  ti 2  Ti and  i 2 (( ~ M i())). By denition
of ~ n,  i is also an element of ((M
~ n 1
 i (jT ~ n 1))). Hence, by Lemma 10, there is
a type ti 2 T ~ n
i  ~ Ti such that BR(jti) is a singleton included in BR ti( i). We
must have: BR(jti) 2 M ~ n(jT ~ n) = ~ Mi(). Consequently, BR ti( i) \ ~ Mi() 6= ;,
as claimed.
4.5 Step 4
The proof of Proposition 4 is notationally involved and is relegated to the Appendix,
but the key ideas are simple. Let us sketch them. Write ~  for the set of e-continuous
21equilibria in U(M?; ~ T) (where ~ T is the model dened in Proposition 3) and dene
the following equivalence classes on ~ . For each ;0 2 ~ , 0 2 [] if and only if:
1. ~ M(0) = ~ M(), and,
2. For each mi 2 ~ Mi(0): ~ ti(mi;0) = ~ ti(mi;) (with the notations of Proposition
3).
Using Point 1 of Proposition 3 (closedness), one can show that for each e-continuous
equilibrium  in U(M?; ~ T ), each type prole  t, and each message prole m 2
R1( tj ~ M();  T ), m also belongs to R1( tjM?;  T ). Now, x an integer N. Using
a contagion argument similar10 to that used in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), one can
build a model T N  ~ T satisfying the following property. For each [] 2 [~ ], each
 t 2  T and each m 2 R1( tj ~ M([]);  T), there exists a type11 t(m;[];N) such that:
(i) We have: t(m;[];N) 2  B 1
N( t):
(ii) At each equilibrium N in U(M?;T N) satisfying N
j ~ T 2 []:

N(t(m;[];N)) = fmg:
Since M? allows for e-continuous implementation, there exists an e-continuous equi-
librium N in U(M?;T N). Setting MN := ~ M(N
j ~ T), we obtain the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 4 There exists a family of message spaces fMNgN2N (with MN =
i2IMN
i  M?, for each N) satisfying the following property: for each N,  t 2  T
and m 2 R1( t jMN;  T ), g(m) 2  Be(N)(f( t)).
Proof. See Appendix.
We now conclude the proof of Theorem 1. Let M be an accumulation point of
the sequence fMNgN2N. (Such an accumulation point exists since M? is nite.) We
establish that the nite mechanism M = (M;g) fully implements f in rationalizable
messages. Pick some  t 2  T and m 2 R1( tjM;  T). For each N, there exists N0  N
such that: M = MN0. Consequently, by Proposition 4, g(m) 2  Be(N0)(f( t)) 
 Be(N)(f( t)). Since e(N) tends toward zero as N ! 1, we obtain: g(m) = f( t),
which concludes the proof. 
10We use Point 2 (Full range) of Proposition 3 to breaks ties and change a best response into a
strict best response.
11Notations are slightly dierent in the core of the proof.
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23A Proofs of Step 1
Proof of Claim 1. Fix a player i. Notice that the set  Mi satises points (i), (ii)
and (iii) of Claim 1. We proceed by induction and assume that for some pi > 0,
these three properties are satised. There exists12 an increasing function v : N ! N
such that for each nite set S  Rj  Mij and each ane subspace E of A(S), the
number of vertices of the convex polytope P = Co(S)\E is smaller than v(jSj). Let
us write K(pi 1) = f(K(pi)). By the induction hypothesis, for each Mi 2 L(pi 1),
we must have: jMij  K(pi   1). By continuity, this property is also true for each
M0
i 2  Li(pi 1), which establishes point (i). Consequently,  Li(pi 1) may be viewed
as a subset of (j  Mij 1)K(pi 1). Now, x a sequence fMn
i gn2N  Li(pi   1) which
tends toward Mi 2 (j  Mij 1)K(pi 1) in the topology associated with the max norm.
The Hausdor distance between Mn
i and Mi tends toward zero as n ! 1. Thus,
Mi 2  Li(pi   1), which establishes point (ii). Finally, regarding point (iii), since
for each M0
i 2 Li(pi   1) there must exist M00
i 2  Li(pi) and an ane subspace Ei
of A(M00
i ) such that Co(M0
i) = Ei \ Co(M00
i ), we must have: A(M0
i) = Ei which
implies: dim(M0
i) < dim(M00
i ). Therefore, by the induction hypothesis: dim(M0
i) 
pi   1. By continuity, we also have: dim(M0
i)  pi   1, for each M0
i 2  Li(pi   1),
which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Claim 2. Fix a model T and a sequence of message spaces fMngn2N with
Mn ! M (in the topology associated with the max norm on I
i=1(j  Mij 1)
 K). In
addition, assume that there exists an e-continuous equilibrium n in U((Mn;g);T )
for each n 2 N. Recall that for each n, we view n as an element of I
i=1(
 K)Ti. Since
this set is compact, taking a subsequence if necessary, there exists a strategy prole
? in U((M;g);T ) such that for each i, each ti and each q = 1;:::;  K : n
i (mn
i;q j ti) !
?
i(mi;q j ti). We establish that the strategy prole ? is an e-continuous equilibrium
12To check this, x a nite set S  R
 Mi and a hyperplan H of A(S). Each vertex of the
convex polytope P = Co(S) \ H must either be a vertex of Co(S) (i.e., an element of S) or the
intersection of an edge of Co(S) and H. Hence, the number of vertices of P is bounded by
jSj(jSj+1)
2 .
Now notice that for each ane subspace E of A(S), there exists a nite sequence fHdgD
d=1 with
D  j  Mij such that HD is an ane hyperplane of A(S), for each d = 1;:::;D 1, Hd is an ane
hyperplane of A(Hd+1) \ ::: \ HD \ Co(S) and:
E \ Co(S) = H1 \ ::: \ HD \ Co(S):
.
24in U((M;g);T ).
Notice rst that ? is an equilibrium in U((M;g);T ). Indeed, x ti 2 Ti. Using












































for all q 2 f1;:::;  Kg.
Now pick  t 2  T, N and t 2  B 1
N( t). Since for each n, n is e-continuous
in U((Mn;g);T ), we have: g(n(t)) 2  Be(N)(f( t)). Since Mn ! M, we have:
g(n(t)) ! g(?(t)), establishing that ? is e-continuous.
We conclude the proof of Claim 2. Regarding Point 1, the fact that ? is an
e-continuous equilibrium in U(M;T ) clearly means that M allows for e-continuous
implementation in T . Regarding Point 2, let M be a message space allowing e-
continuous implementation in T and let fngn2N be a sequence of e-continuous
equilibria in U(M;T ) converging toward some strategy prole ?. Applying the
argument above with Mn = M for each n, we know that ? is an e-continuous
equilibrium in U(M;T ). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume that for each p0  p, there is no message space in
 L(p0) allowing for e-continuous implementation. This means that there is a collection
T(p) of nite models such that for each p0  p and message space M 2  L(p0), there
exists a model T (M) 2 T(p) such that there is no e-continuous equilibrium in




 L(p0) for which there is no e-continuous equilibrium in U((M;g);T ).




 K. In addition, by denition




















 L(p0) and some equilibrium  in U((M;g);T (p)). For each T 2
T?(p), the restriction jT of  to the type space T is an equilibrium in U((M;g);T ).
Hence, by denition of T?(p) there must exist some T 2 T?(p) such that jT is not
e-continuous, which establishes that  is not e-continuous. 
Proof of Lemma 3. We rst establish that for each e-continuous equilibrium  in
U(M(p?);T (p?   1)) and each player i:
A(i(Ti(p
?   1)) = A(Mi(p
?)): (6)
Proceed by contradiction and assume that there exists an e-continuous equilibrium
 in U(M(p?);T (p?   1)) such that for some player i, A(i(Ti(p?   1)) is strictly
included in A(Mi(p?)). Write p?
i for the smallest integer pi such that Mi(p?) 2
 Li(pi) and M0
i for the message set such that : Co(M0
i) = A(i(Ti(p?))\Co(Mi(p?)).
Since dim(Mi(p?))  1, by Claim 1, p?
i  1 and thus the set Li(p?
i  1) is well-dened.
By construction, M0
i 2 Li(p?
i   1) and (M0
i;M i(p?)) 2  L(p?   1).
Notice that since i(Ti(p? 1))  Co(Mi(p?)), we must also have: i(Ti(p? 1)) 
Co(M0
i). Consequently, if we dene a new mechanism by replacing Mi(p?) by M0
i, we
can build for each ti, ~ i(ti) 2 (M0
i) such that g(i(ti);) = g(~ i(ti);). Since i is a
best response to  i in U((Mi(p?);M i(p?);g);T (p? 1)) and Co(M0
i)  Co(Mi(p?)),
~ i must also be a best response to  i in U((M0
i;M i(p?);g);T (p? 1)). Hence, the
strategy prole (~ i; i) is an e-continuous equilibrium in U((M0
i;M i(p?);g);T (p? 
1)), a contradiction with the denition of T (p?   1). This establishes Equation (6).
Now, recall that for each strategy prole  in U(M(p?);T (p?   1)) and each
player i, we have: M i(p?) = j6=iMj(p?) and  i(T i(p?  1)) = j6=ii(Ti(p?  1)).


















which concludes the proof of Lemma 3. 
Claim 5 For each player i, let Yi be a nite set fy1
i;:::;y
`i
i g  R




 i g (with l i = j6=ilj). We have:







26where A(Y i) and A(
Q
j6=i




in Rj  M ij .
Proof. Since Y i 
Q
j6=i
A (Yj), we have: A (Y i)  A(
Q
j6=i
A (Yj)). Hence, it suf-
ces to show that
Q
j6=i




A(A (Y i)) = A (Y i):) Recall that by construction of Y i there exists a bi-














j . Now, note that if x i =
Q
j6=i



















 i where the vector  i 2 R` i






j (where  1(k)j is the
jth component of the preimage of k by bijection ). Write j(1);:::;j(I  1) for the
























































































27Hence, x i belongs to the ane hull of Y i in RjM ij; which concludes the proof.
Proof of Claim 3. Fix a player i and two messages mi;m0
i 2 M?
i . By con-
struction, there must exist m i(mi;m0




i)) (Otherwise, one of these two messages would have been elimi-
nated). Since only redundant messages have been eliminated from M i(p?) to obtain
M?





















which concludes the proof. 
28B Proofs of Step 2
Proof of Lemma 4. We rst establish the following claim.
Claim 6 Fix  " > 0. There exists ~ "( ") 2 R
jAj
+ with k~ "( ")k <  " such that for all
players i, all types  ti and all messages mi, m0
i 2 M?
i , we have: [mi]
~ "( ")




Proof. First notice that since M? contains no redundant messages, for each mi;m0
i 2
M?
i , there exists m i(mi;m0
i) 2 M?
















if and only if :







i))   Eu ti(mi;m i(mi;m0
i));
where we recall that an outcome is identied with a point in RjAj and  stands for
the dot product. This means that the ane subspace of vectors ~ " 2 RjAj such that
Equation (8) holds is of dimension jAj 1. Since M?
i and  Ti are nite, this concludes
the proof.
We now conclude the proof of Lemma 4. By Claim 6, for each type  ti, the sets
of mappings  i 2 ?





 ti (mi; i) = Eu
~ "( ")
 ti (m0
i; i) is equal to 
~ "( ")
 ti . Hence, Claim 4 allows to conclude
the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix  ti 2  Ti and  > 0. By Claim 4, we know that  ti is




2 ane hyperplanes of ?
 i. Write B( ti) for the




i , the function  i 7! jEu ti(mi; i)   Eu ti(m0
i; i)j is






jEu ti(mi; i)   Eu ti(m
0
i; i)j
29is also continuous. Besides, this function is strictly positive for each  i 2 ?
 iB( ti).
Since ?







jEu ti(mi; i)   Eu ti(m
0
i; i)j  2 "()
We deduce that for each  i 2 ?
 iB( ti), mi;m0
i 2 M?
i with mi 2 BR ti( i)
and m0
i = 2 BR ti( i), we have:
Eu ti(mi; i)   Eu ti(m
0
i; i)  2 "(): (9)
Recall that, by construction, for each mi 2 M?




 ti(mi; i)  Eu ti(mi; i)  Eu
~ "
 ti(mi; i)    "();
for all ~ " 2 RjAj with k~ "k   "(). Consequently, Equation (9) implies:
Eu
~ "




i; i)   "();
which gives: BR~ "
 ti( i)  BR ti( i). 





S i( r), we set:
D(S i) := fy 2 
?








Moreover, for each S i 2 S i( r), we write D i(N;S i) for the set of subsets
D   i(N) such that: dim(D(S i)) < dim(?
 i).
Claim 7 There exists D i(N) such that: D i(N) = D i(N;S i), for all S i 2
S i( r). Besides, for each D 2 D i(N), jDj  (N + 1)dim(?
 i) 1.
Proof. Fix S i = fs0;:::;sdim(?
 i)g 2 S i( r) and D 2 D i(N;S i). Recall that
since  r > 0, the vectors s1 s0;:::;sdim(?
 i) s0 are linearly independent. Now notice
that for each y =
Pdim(?
 i)




Hence, the coordinates of y in the coordinate system associated with the ane basis
(s0;s1 s0;:::;sdim(?
 i) s0) are given by (x`)
dim(?
 i)
`=1 . Consequently, dim(D(S i)) <
dim(?
 i) if and only if there exists a vector a 2 Rdim(?
 i) (which is not the null
30vector) and b 2 R such that:
Pdim(?
 i)
`=1 a`x` = b for each x 2 D. Dening D i(N)
to be the union (over a 2 Rdim(?
 i) and b 2 R) of the subsets D   i(N) such that
Pdim(?
 i)
`=1 a`x` = b for each x 2 D, we obtain: D i(N) = D i(N;S i).




`=1 such that for each `, y` is an integer of the interval [0;N]. By the
above argument, there exists at most one element x 2 D such that x` =
y`
N for
all ` = 1;:::;dim(?
 i)   1. This establishes that for each D 2 D i(N), jDj 
(N + 1)dim(?
 i) 1.







i j   1) + 1
:
Proof. Fix an integer N  dim(?
 i) and write Int( N
dim(?
 i)) for the integer value
of N
dim(?
 i). Now, x a vector y = (y`)
dim(?
 i)
`=1 such that for each `, y` is an integer
of the interval [0;Int( N
dim(?































Since the right-hand side of this inequality tends toward 0 as N tends toward innity,
this concludes the proof.
Claim 9 There exists ( r) > 0 such that for each D   i(N?) with D = 2 D i(N?)
and each S i 2 S i( r), we have:  i(Co(D(S i))) > ( r).
Proof. Fix D   i(N?) with D = 2 D i(N?). For each S i 2 S i( r), dim(D(S i)) =
dim(?
 i), implying that  i(Co(D(S i))) > 0. Since the function  i(Co(D()) is
continuous and the set S i( r) is compact, there exists ( r;D) > 0 such that for each
S i 2 S i( r), we have:  i(Co(D(S i))) > ( r;D). Now, it suces to notice that
since the set  i(N?) is nite, the set D i(N?) is also nite.
31We are now in position to conclude the proof of Lemma 6. Choose ( r) > 0 such
that for each ane hyperplane H of ?
 i,
 i(B( r)(H))  ( r): (10)
Let us check that N? (as dened in Claim 7) and ( r) satisfy the condition of
Lemma 6. For each ane hyperplane H of ?
 i and S i 2 S i( r), dene D(H;S i) 
 i(N?) by:
D




(H;S i)(S i)) = Co(B( r)(H) \ (N
?;S i))  Co(B( r)(H)) = B( r)(H):
Consequently by Equation (10),  i(Co(D(H;S i)(S i)))  ( r) and by Claim 9,







i j   1) + 1
:
Since jD(H;S i)j = jB( r)(H) \ (N?;S i)j and j i(N?)j = j(N?;S i)j, this con-
cludes the proof. 
32C Proofs of Step 3
Proof of Lemma 7. We prove Lemma 11 which implies Lemma 7 (setting  = 1)
and will be used in the sequel of the proof of Proposition 3 (more precisely for
establishing Lemma 10.)
Lemma 11 For each  > 0, there exists  r() > 0 satisfying the following property.
For each e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M?;T 0) and each player i, there exists
! i 2 
 i such that for each ?
 i 2 ?













belongs to S i( r()).
Proof. Fix  > 0. We rst establish the following claim.











Proof. Fix an e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M?;T 0) and ?
 i 2 ?
 i. Let us set:
M i(;
?











In addition, we note  i() for the set of mappings from  to  i(T 0

























By Proposition 1, dim( i(T 0
i )) = dim(M?
 i). Since  > 0, this means that13, for






13To check this, recall that, by denition of dim( i(T0






 i; g   i(T0


























Notice that for each subset of  i(;?
 i;) containing dim(?
 i)+1 elements there
exists some ! i such that S i(! i;;?










Hence, there must exist ! i() 2 




We now conclude the proof of Lemma 11. Recall that we write 0 for the set
of e-continuous equilibria in U(M?;T 0). Dene the function  : 0  ?








 i) is strictly positive for each  2 0 and ?
 i 2 ?
 i. Recall that
by Claim 2, the set 0 is compact. Since the set ?
 i is compact15 and the function
 is continuous in its two arguments, we deduce that there exists  r() > 0 such that
(;?
 i) >  r() for each  2 0 and ?
 i 2 ?
 i, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 8. Fix  ti 2  Ti and ! i 2 

















for all  2 ;a 2 A? and t0
 i 2 T 0
 i, (where 1!`
 i()(t0





 i) = 0 otherwise.) Let us set:
T
1




We establish that T 1
i ( ti;! i) satises the property dened in Lemma 8. Pick some










14Caratheodory's theorem states that if a point x 2 Rd lies in the convex hull of a set P, there
is a subset P0 of P consisting of d + 1 points such that x lies in the convex hull of P0.
15Indeed,   i is compact in Rjj(j  M ij+1) and ? is a closed subset of   i.
34For each t0
 i 2 T 0
 i,  2  and m i 2 M?
 i, we write  i(m ijt0
 i) (resp.  i(m ij))
for the probability assigned to m i by  i(t0
 i) (resp.  i()). For all a 2 A?,  2 
and m i 2 M?






























































which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 9. Fix ! i 2 
 i and  ti 2  Ti. Notice that for each  i 2
(N?; i  ! i) and mi 2 M?
i , the expected utility of type ti(x( i)) (with the
notation of Lemma 8) playing mi against  i is equal to:
X











BR( j ti(x( i))) = BR
~ "( r)
 ti ( i): (11)
We now show that T 1
i satises the property dened in Lemma 9. Fix some e-
continuous equilibrium  in U(M?;T 1). Notice that the strategy prole jT0 is an
e-continuous equilibrium in U(M?;T 0). Consequently, by Lemma 7, there exists
! i 2 
 i such that the set (jT0) i  ! i belongs to S i( r). Hence, applying Point
1 of Proposition 2, we know that there exists  i 2 (N?;(jT0) i  ! i) such that
BR
~ "( r)
 ti ( i) is a singleton. Using Equation (11) and Lemma 8, we conclude that
there exists ti 2 T 1
i such that BR( j ti) is a singleton. 
Proof of Lemma 10. We rst establish the following result.
35Claim 11 For each M i  M?
 i and  ti 2  Ti, there exists a nite family F( ti;M i) 
((M i)) such that for any  i 2 ((M i)), there exists ?




 i) = BR ti( i).
Proof. Fix  ti and M i  M?
 i. We dene the (nite) set i( ti;M i) by:




i j9 i 2 ((M i))
 s: t: M
0
i = BR ti( i)g:
For each M0
i 2 i( ti;M i), dene  i(M0
i) by: M0









By upper hemi-continuity of correspondence BR ti(), there exists ? 2 (0;1] such
that for each i,  ti 2  Ti, M i  M?
 i and ?
 i 2 F( ti;M i):
BR ti( i)  BR ti(
?
 i);




 i. For notational simplicity, we
write ~ "? 2 R
jAj
+ for the vector ~ "( r(?)) (with the notations of Proposition 2 and





















We build inductively the family of models fT ngn1 as follows. The rst element
of this family is the model T 1 dened in Lemma 9. Now x some integer n. For each
e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M?;T n), each player i 2 I and each message mi 2
Mn




fmig and dene the following equivalence classes over the set n of e-continuous
equilibria in U(M?;T n). For each ;0 2 n, 0 2 [] if and only if for each player
i:
1. We have: Mn
i () = Mn
i (0);
362. For each mi 2 Mn
i (): tn
i (mi;) = tn
i (mi;0).
Notice that since T n is nite, the set of equivalence classes dened above is
nite. Fix i 2 I,  ti 2  Ti and ! i 2 
 i. For each  2 n, ?
 i 2 F( ti;Mn()) and







































for all  2 , a 2 A?, m i 2 M?
 i and t0
 i 2 T 0
 i. Notice that since for each
m i 2 Mn
 i(), tn
 i(m i;) does not belong to T 0


































We establish the following lemma which is very similar to Lemma 8.
Lemma 12 Fix  ti 2  Ti and ! i 2 
 i. The type space T
n+1
i ( ti;! i) satises























for all a 2 A?,  2  and m i 2 M?
 i.
Proof. Fix some  2 n, ?




By construction, there exists x(0
 i) 2  i(N?) such that:

0














37For all a 2 A?,  2  and m i 2 M?







































Hence, the type space T
n+1
i ( ti;! i) satises the property described in Lemma 12.
We now conclude the proof of Lemma 10. Fix ! i 2 
 i and  ti 2  Ti. Notice that
for each  2 n, ?
i 2 F( ti;Mn()), 0
 i 2 (N?;S i(! i;;?
 i;?)) and mi 2 M?
i
the expected utility of type ti(x(0
 i);[];?
 i) (with the notation used in Lemma 12






























We are now in imposition to show that the model T n+1 satises the properties
described in Lemma 10. Since T 1  T n+1, by Lemma 9, Point 1 is satised. Re-
garding Point 2, x some e-continuous equilibrium  in U(M?;T n+1),  ti 2  Ti and
 i 2 ((Mn
 i(jTn))). By Claim 11, there exists ?
 i 2 Fn( ti;Mn
 i(jTn)) such
that BR ti(?
 i) = BR ti( i). By Lemma 11, there exists ! i 2 
 i such that the
set S i(! i;;?
 i;?) belongs to S( r(?)). Hence, by Proposition 2, there exists
some 0
 i 2 (N?;S i(! i;;?
 i;?)) such that BR
~ "?
 ti (0
 i) is a singleton included
in BR ti(0
 i). Consequently, using Equation (12) and Lemma 12, we know that there




i such that BR( j t
n+1
i ) is a singleton included in BR ti(0
 i).
By construction of ?, this means that BR( j t
n+1
i ) is a singleton included in
BR ti(?
 i). By denition of ?
 i, this nally implies that BR( j t
n+1
i ) is a singleton
included in BR ti( i), which concludes the proof. 
38D Proof of Proposition 4
By denition of a rationalizable message, we know that for each e-continuous equi-
librium  in U(M?; ~ T ) and each mi 2 R1
i ( ti j ~ M();  T ) (where ~ M() is the
message space dened in Proposition 3), there must exist a belief b( ti;mi;) 2
(   T i  ~ M i()) such that:
1. We have: marg  T i b( ti;mi;) = ( ti);
2. The message mi is a best response to marg ~ M i( ) b( ti;mi;) when the mes-
sage space of player i is restricted to ~ Mi();
3. For each  2 ; t i 2  T i and m i 2 ~ M i(), the probability assigned to
(; t i;m i) by the belief b( ti;mi;) is strictly positive only if m i belongs to
the set R1
 i( t i j ~ M();  T ).
For ease of exposition, we sometimes consider b( ti;mi;) as a measure over   T i
~ M i() and sometimes as a measure over ?   T i  ~ M i() assigning probability
one on f~ 0g.
We write ~  for the set of e-continuous equilibria in U(M?; ~ T) (where ~ T is the
model dened in Proposition 3) and dene the equivalence classes over ~  as follows.
For each ;0 2 ~ , we say that 0 2 [] if and only if:
1. ~ M(0) = ~ M(), and,
2. For each mi 2 ~ Mi(0): ~ ti(mi;0) = ~ ti(mi;) (with the notations of Proposition
3).
For each model T  ~ T and each e-continuous equilibria  in U(M?;T ), we will
identify [] with [j ~ T].
Now x some equivalence class [] 2 [~ ]. For each i 2 I,  ti 2  Ti, mi 2 R1
i ( ti j
~ M();  T ) and " > 0, we dene inductively the sequence of types f^ ti[";k;[]; ti;mi]gk2N
as follows. Type ^ ti[";1;[]; ti;mi] is dened by:
(^ ti[";1;[]; ti;mi]) = (~ ti(mi;)):
And for each k  2, ^ ti[";k;[]; ti;mi] is dened by













stands for the preimage of the function 
";k
 i : (?; t i;m i) 7 !
 
?;^ t i[";k   1;; t i;m i]

.
Lemma 13 below shows that when " is suciently small and k is suciently
large, type ^ ti[";k;[]; ti;mi] is "very close" to type  ti.
Lemma 13 For each integer N, there exist k(N) and "(N) > 0 such that for each
 2 ~ ; ti 2  Ti and mi 2 R1
i ( ti j ~ M();  T ), we have:
^ ti["(N);k(N);[]; ti;mi] 2  B 1
N( ti):
Recall that fonction hi (dened in Section 2.3) associates to each type ti its
induced hierarchy of beliefs. We rst establish the following claim.










i ( ti); (13)
for all  2 ~ ,  ti 2  Ti and mi 2 R1
i ( ti j ~ M();  T ).
Proof. First notice that Equation (13) holds true at rank k = 1. Indeed, for all
k0  1;  ti 2  Ti and mi 2 R1








= marg? (^ ti[0;k
0;[]; ti;mi])






= marg? b( ti;mi;) = marg?  ( ti) = h
1
i( ti)
where the third and the fourth equalities are by denition of 
0;k0
 i and b( ti;mi;[])
respectively. Now x some k  2 and let L be the set of all belief proles of players




0;[]; tj;mj]) = h
k 1
j ( tj);
for each j,  tj 2  Tj and mj 2 R1
j ( tj j ~ M();  T ). Then for all k0  k :
proj?L  (id  h i)  
0;k0
 i = proj?L 

id  h i  id ~ M i([])

;
where id (resp. id ~ M i()) is the identity mapping from  to  (resp. from ~ M i()
to ~ M i()) while proj?L (resp. proj?L) is the projection mapping from ?T ?
40to ?  L (resp. from ?  T ?  ~ M i() to ?  L); hence for all k0  k;  ti 2  Ti
and mi 2 R1
i ( ti j ~ M();  T ) :
marg?L (^ ti[0;k
0;[]; ti;mi])  (id  h i)






 (id  h i)
 1











= b( ti;mi;) 
 





= marg?L b( ti;mi;) 

id  h i  id ~ M i()
 1






0;[]; ti;mi]) = hk 1
i (^ ti[0;k0;[]; ti;mi])  marg?L (^ ti[0;k
0;[]; ti;mi])  (id  h i)
 1
= hk 1





i(^ ti[0;k0;[]; ti;mi]) = hk
i( ti) for all k0  k:
Since the sets [~ ],  T and M? are nite, the following Claim 12 concludes the
proof of Lemma 14.








as " tends toward zero.
Proof. This is a rather direct consequence of the following fundamental result.
Lemma 14 (Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993))
Let T = (T;) be any model such that ?  T is complete and separable and  is a
continuous function of ti. Then, the mapping h : T ! T ? is continuous.




qg [ f0g and we dene the (innite
countable) type space ^ Ti[k;[]; ti;mi] by:
^ Ti[k;[]; ti;mi] := f
[
"2C
^ ti[";k;[]; ti;mi]g [ ~ Ti;
Finally, we write T [k;[]; ti;mi] for the model associated with the type space ^ Ti[k;[]; ti;mi]
~ T i and we endow the model T [k;[]; ti;mi] with the topology associated with the
following distance. For all ";"0 2 C, the distance between types ^ ti[";k;[]; ti;mi]
and ^ ti["0;k;[]; ti;mi] is equal to j"   "0j. For any ti 2 ~ Ti, the distance between ti
41and any other type t0
i 2 ^ Ti[k;[]; ti;mi] is equal to one. For any j 6= i, the distance
between two types tj and t0
j is also equal to one.
It can easily be checked that the model T [k;[]; ti;mi] satises the conditions of
Lemma 14 above. Consequently, the fact that ^ ti[";k;[~ ]; ti;mi] ! ^ ti[0;k;[~ ]; ti;mi]






















i ( tij ~ M(); T )
^ ti["(N);k;[]; ti;mi]g [ ~ Ti;
(where k(N) and "(N) have been dened in Lemma 13). Since the mechanism
M? allows for e-continuous implementation for all nite type spaces, we know that
there exists an e-continuous equilibrium ^ N in the game U(M?; ^ T N). We set MN :=
~ M(^ N
j ~ T) (with the notations of Proposition 3).
Now pick some  t 2  T and m 2 R1( t j MN;  T ). Using the fact that ^ N is
e-continuous and Lemma 13 above, Lemma 15 below allows to establish that m 2
 Be(N)(f( t)), which concludes the proof of Proposition 4.
Lemma 15 For each  ti 2  Ti and mi 2 R1
i ( ti j MN;  T ), we have:
^ 
N
i (^ ti["(N);k(N);[^ 
N]; ti;mi]) = fmig:
Proof. We show by induction on k that for all k 2 f1;:::;k(N)g,  ti 2  Ti, and
mi 2 R1
i ( ti j MN;  T ):
^ 
N
i (^ ti["(N);k;[^ 
N]; ti;mi]) = fmig: (14)
For k = 1, by construction, we know that for any  ti 2  Ti, and mi 2 R1
i ( ti j
MN;  T ):
(^ ti["(N);1;[^ 
N]; ti;mi]) = (~ ti(mi; ^ 
N
j ~ T)).
Hence, by denition of ~ ti(mi; ^ j ~ T), the proof of this step is completed. Now x some
k < k(N) and assume that for each i,  ti 2  Ti, and mi 2 R1
i ( ti j MN;  T ), Equation
(14) holds true at rank k. We show that the same property holds for k + 1.
Fix  ti 2  Ti, and mi 2 R1
i ( ti j MN;  T ). Recall that type ^ ti["(N);k +1; ti;m i] is
dened by:





 1+"(N)(~ ti(mi; ^ 
N)):
42Dene the belief i 2 (?  ^ T N
 i  M?
 i) by:
i = (^ ti[^ ";k + 1;[^ 





^ N : (?;t i) 7! (?;t i; ^ N
 i(t i)), for each ? 2 ? and t i 2 ^ T N
 i. Notice
that i is the belief of type ^ ti[^ ";k + 1;[^ N]; ti;mi] on ?  ^ T N
 i  M?
 i when the
equilibrium ^ N is played. On the one hand, we have:
marg?M?
 i (~ ti(mi; ^ 
N
j ~ T))  (
^ N)
 1 = i(j~ ti(mi; ^ 
N
j ~ T); ^ 
N
j ~ T): (15)




N]; t i;m i]) = (
?;^ t i["(N);k;[^ 
N]; t i;m i];m i);
for each ? 2 ?,  t i 2  T i and m i 2 R1
 i( t ijMN;  T ). Consequently,
marg?MN
 i b( ti;mi; ^ 
N













Putting Equations (15) and (16) together we conclude that the belief i(j^ ti["(N);k+
1;[^ ]; ti;mi]; ^ N) of type ^ ti["(N);k + 1;[^ ]; ti;mi] over ?  MN
 i when the strategy
prole ^ N is played satises:
i(j^ ti["(N);k+1;[^ 
N]; ti;mi]; ^ 
N) = (1 "(N)) marg?MN
 i b( ti;mi; ^ 
N
j ~ T)+"(N)i(j~ ti(mi; ^ 
N
j ~ T); ^ 
N
~ T ):
Recall that by denition mi is a best response to the belief marg?MN
 ib( ti;mi; ^ N
j ~ T)
when the message space of player i is restricted to ~ Mi(^ N
j ~ T) = MN
i . Consequently,
by Point 1 of Proposition 3 (closedness) (setting  i = marg?M?
 ib( ti;mi; ^ N
j ~ T)),
mi is also a best response to marg?MN
 ib( ti;mi; ^ j ~ T) when the message space of
player i is M?
i . Since the best response to the belief i(j~ ti(mi; ^ N
j ~ T); ^ N
j ~ T) (when the
message space of player i is M?
i ) is the singleton fmig, this establishes that the best
response to the belief i(j^ ti["(N);k +1;[^ N]; ti;mi]; ^ N) must also be the singleton
fmig. Finally, the fact that ^ N is an equilibrium allows to conclude that Equation
(14) holds true at rank k + 1.
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